An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge - download pdf or read online
By Noah Lemos
Epistemology or the speculation of information is without doubt one of the cornerstones of analytic philosophy, and this e-book offers a transparent and obtainable creation to the topic. It discusses a few of the major theories of justification, together with foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and advantage epistemology. different issues comprise the Gettier challenge, internalism and externalism, skepticism, the matter of epistemic circularity, the matter of the criterion, a priori wisdom, and naturalized epistemology. meant essentially for college kids taking a first-class in epistemology, this lucid and well-written textual content may additionally offer a superb creation for somebody attracted to understanding extra approximately this significant region of philosophy.
Part of the Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy sequence.
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Extra resources for An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge
As we noted in chapter 1, it is commonly assumed that one can be justified in believing a false proposition. To be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of nonconclusive evidence is to have evidence that does not guarantee the truth of what is believed. As long as we accept that a proposition can be justified for us on the basis of nonconclusive evidence or reasons, we must accept that we can be justified in believing some false proposition. Second, the examples presuppose the following Principle of Deductive Closure (PDC): Principle of Deductive Closure The Gettier problem If S is justified in believing that p and p entails q and S deduces q from p and accepts q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing q.
Again, this is because there is a true proposition which is such that if Smith believed it, then he would not be justified in believing (h). If Smith were justified in believing the true proposition, that Jones is merely pretending to own a Ford, then he would not be justified in believing the false proposition (f), Jones owns a Ford, and, consequently, he would not be justified in believing (h). Since Smith’s belief in (h) does not meet condition (4) in D8, D8 implies that Smith does not know (h).
Smith has a justified true belief in (e). According to D6, then, Smith does not know (e), since his grounds for believing (e) include the false proposition (d). Smith’s belief in (e) does not meet our added fourth condition. Similar considerations would apply to Case 2. In that case, Smith’s grounds for believing (h), Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, include the falsehood, (f), Jones owns a Ford. So, Smith’s belief in (h) fails to meet the added fourth condition and, thus, we get the right result that Smith does not know (h).
An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge by Noah Lemos